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CHAPTER 9 
Consumer Law 
WILLIAM F. WILLIER* 
§9.1. Chapter 93A, The Consumer Protection Act. Chapter 93A1 
of the General Laws, entitled the "Regulation of Business Practice and 
Consumer Protection Act,"2 would appear to have raised as many 
legal questions as it has answered. 3 These questions have concerned 
both substance and procedure, although the overlap between the two 
categories is apparent. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court addressed both issues. 
A new and distinct cause of action. In two cases decided during the 
Survey year, Commonwealth v. DeCotis 4 and Slaney v. Westwood Auto, 
Inc., 5 the Supreme Judicial Court made clear that the cause of action 
under chapter 93A is a new and distinct one created by statute and 
not derivative of any common law cause of action in either contract or 
tort. 6 In Slaney, the Court stated: 
The absence from the foregoing discussion of any mention of 
the common law action for fralJid and deceit is entirely 
intentional. ... [T]he definition of an actionable "unfair or decep-
tive act or practice" goes far beyond the scope of the common law 
action for fraud and deceit. To cite only a few distinctions, in a 
statutory action proof of actual reliance by the plaintiff on a rep-
resentation is not required, ... and it is not necessary to establish 
that the defendant knew that the representation was false .... [A 
section 9 claim for relief] is, therefore, sui generis. It is neither 
wholly tortious nor wholly contractual in nature, and is not subject 
*WILLIAM F. WILLIER is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. Talmadge D. 
Veale, a student at the law school, assisted Professor Willier in the preparation of this 
chapter. 
§ 9.1. 1 G.L. c. 93A (originally enacted as Acts of 1967, c. 813, § 1). 
2 Acts of 1967, c. 813, § 2. 
3 See, e.g., Willier & Hamilton, Consumer Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 14.6, at 
311-13; Willier, Consumer Law, 1972 ANN. SURVEY MASS. LAW§§ 10.6, 10.7, at 271-76. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425, 316 N.E.2d 748. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 322 N.E.2d 768. 
6 Slaney, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 198-99,322 N.E.2d at 779; DeCotis, 1974 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1434 n.8, 316 N.E.2d at 755 n.8. 
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to the traditional limitations of pre-existing causes of action such 
as tort for fraud and deceit. 7 
For the same reason, the Court in DeCotis rejecte~ the Attorney 
General's argument that chapter 93A could Be applitid retroactively 
since it simply codified the common law causes of act~on and merely 
provided new procedural methods for their vindication. 8 The act de-
termined to be "unfair" in DeCotis-the extraction of e;:ommissions by 
owners of a mobile home park upon the sale of mobile homes by 
mobile home owners-was not technically a cause of adtion under any 
other theory. Some owners had, in fact, signed rental forms that spe-
cifically provided for the commission. 9 
This is not to say, however, that a cause of action brought under 
chapter 93A could not contain elements of a more trad!itional cause of 
action. Indeed, the Slaney case involved a breach of an oral express 
warranty under section 2-313 of chapter 106 of the General Laws, the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 10 By regulation of the Attorney General, 
failure to honor a warranty obligation is an unfait or deceptive 
practice.U 
The Court has left unanswered, however, the question whether a 
party can combine a traditional cause of action, with a chapter 93A 
action, which is an action that invokes the equity jurisdiction of the 
superior court. 12 For example, if a plaintiff buyer cduld establish a 
warranty and its breach, he could, under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, revoke acceptance, cancel, and recover the price paid and 
damages. 13 At the least, he could recover damages under section 
2-714. Certainly pleadings held by a court to be suffici~nt under chap-
ter 93A to withstand a demurrer are sufficiently broa~ to encompass 
such claims for relief. In any event, the "actual damages" recoverable 
by the consumer under chapter 93A 14 could well be measured by the 
recovery allowed under the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 
Elements of a cause of action. The Court in Slaney traced the legislative 
history of chapter 93A and articulated the pleading requirements of 
that chapter. In order to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, a party must allege facts that would establish the following: 
( 1) that there was a pu.rchase or lease of goods, services, or real or 
personal property; 16 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 198-99, 322 N.E.2d at 779. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1434 n.8, 316 N.E.2d at 755 n.8. See Hanscom v. Malden & 
Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E. 426, 427-28 (1914). 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1427,316 N.E.2d at 751. 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 176-77,322 N.E.2d at 771. 
11 REGULATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL§ IV, A. 
u G.L. c. 93A, § 9. , 
1a G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-601, 2-608, 2-711. 
14 G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). 
15 See G.L. c. 106, § 2-714. 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 194, 322 N.E.2d at 777. See G.L. c. 93A, 9{1). 
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(2) that the transaction was primarily for a consumer purpose, i.e., 
for either personal, family, or household purposes; 17 
(3) that in connection with the transaction the defendant engaged in 
an unfair or deceptive act or practice; 18 
(4) that a demand for an offer of settlement was sent by the plain-
tiff and that, within thirty days, he either received no response or re-
jected the defendant's offer as unreasonable; 19 and 
(5) that a loss has been suffered as a result of the alleged unfair or 
deceptive act or practice. 20 
Although the plaintiffs pleadings in Slaney were not precise in all of 
these elements, the Court held that they were sufficient to withstand a 
demurrer since the necessary inferences could be derived from those 
pleadings. 21 The Court cautioned, however, that "the pleader may be 
well advised to avoid undue reliance on inferences which can only in-
vite a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can 
be granted."22 In short, the Court has announced that it will be liberal 
in interpreting pleadings under the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but that a party should not depend too much upon that 
liberality.23 
Scope of chapter 93A: judicial Developments. Section 2 of chapter 93A 
declares unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct 
of any trade or commerce." In Commonwealth v. DeCotis, the Court in-
dicated that there are virtually no limitations to what can constitute 
such unfair or deceptive acts or pratices. The Court honored the 
statutory mandate to look to Federal Trade Commission rules and 
decisions,24 and stated: 
Unfairness under the Federal act has not been limited to practices 
forbidden at common law or by criminal statute .... 
The existence of unfair acts and practices must be determined 
from the circumstances of each case. We do not now undertake to 
establish general rules which may be applied in other situations. 
The nature of the statute and the development of the law under 
the comparable Federal statute indicate that such an attempt 
would be undesirable. 25 
The Court also showed a willingness to look to decisions in other 
states construing statutes similar to chapter 93A. 26 In addition, the 
" 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 194, 322 N.E.2d at 777. See G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1). 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 195-96, 322 N.E.2d at 778. See G.L. c. 93A, §9(1). 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 199, 322 N.E.2d at 779. See G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). 
20 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 199, 322 N.E.2d at 779. See G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 194-95, 322 N.E.2d at 777-78. 
22 !d. at 195, 322 N .E.2d at 778. 
23 /d. 
24 G.L. c. 93A, § 2(b). 
25 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1432, 316 N.E.2d at 754. 
26 ,/d. at 1433, 316 N.E.2d at 754-55. The Court several times cited with approval 
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971). 
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Court rejected two arguments made by the defendaJt, holding that 
(1) the mere fact that all or most merchants engage in1 the challenged 
act or practice does not save such conduct from bdng unfair or 
deceptive,27 and (2) that licensing or regulation by a state or local 
agency that has nothing to do with, and does not sanction, the chal-
lenged act or practice, does not bring it within the exemption of sec-
tion 3(1)(a) of chapter 93A. That section exempts transactions "other-
wise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or 
officer acting under statutory authority of the commonwealth .... "28 
Moreover, in construing the phrase "any trade or commerce di-
rectly or indirectly affecting the people of this Cotnmonwealth"29 
-the Act's statutory definition of "trade or commerce" -the Court 
stated: "A wide range of activities has been included within the word 
'commerce' as used in § 5(a)( 1) of the Federal Trade Collilmission Act,"30 
indicating that it would not be constr:ained in finding such activities. 
From the sweeping language of DeCotis, it is clear that the Attorney 
General has authority to attack a wide range of heretqfore sacrosanct 
business activities. It is not so clear that the individual victims them-
selves may do so. Subsection (1) of section 9 begins: "Any person who 
purchases or leases goods, services or property, real 'or personal ... 
and thereby suffers any loss of money or property ... may, as 
hereinafter provided, bring an action .... " This language raises the 
question whether a consumer injured by an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice is foreclosed from bringing an action under chapter 93A 
where his injury has not resulted from a purchase or leaseY A con-
sumer may well discover that he or she has been victimized after a 
transaction is consummated but before a "sale" or a "purchase" has 
occurred. For example, under the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
term "purchase" is defined as a transaction "creating an interest in 
property,"32 and the concept of "sale" involves the pas~ing of title. 33 A 
contract for sale calling for future performance by th~ seller is not a 
sale, 34 yet an unfair act or practice with respect to that contract-e.g., 
the merchant's failure to make a timely delivery of the 
product35-could adversely affect the consumer. This issue did not 
arise in Slaney because the buyer had in fact purchased the product 
involved; it would appear that its resolution must await further con-
27 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1430-33, 316 N.E.2d at 753. 
28 G.L. c. 93A, § 3(1)(a). 
29 GL. c. 93A, § 1(b). 
30 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1429, 316 N.E.2d at 752. 
31 Although this issue was not before the Court in Slaney, the Court there indicated 
that a purchase or lease was a required element of a private 93A! action. 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 194, 322 N.E.2d at 777. . 
32 G.L. c. 106, § 1-201(32). 
33 Jd. § 2-106(1). 
3< I d. 
35 REGULATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL§ XIV, C. 
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sideration by the Court of the construction of the terms "purchase" 
and "lease." 
In Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust, 36 decided subsequent to the 
close of the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court held that courts 
must construe literally section 9(1), which requires that a loss of 
"money or property" be suffered by the consumer. 37 The Court af-
firmed the dismissal of claims brought pursuant to chapter 93A for 
"severe emotional distress"38 suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of 
unlawful collection practices.39 Nonetheless, Justice Braucher, writing 
for the Court, observed: "We recognize that our disposition of this 
case is not entirely satisfactory. The plaintiffs allege clear, serious and 
continuing violations of G.L. c. 93, § 49, and there must be some 
remedy."40 The Court noted that causes of action apart from chapter 
93A, such as those in tort, might have existed,41 but that the plaintiffs' 
sole reliance on chapter 93A was fatal error since they did not allege a 
loss of "money or property."42 
Thus, chapter 93A, as construed by the Court in Baldassari, 
provides inadequate remedies for certain obvious consumer abuses. 
The message is clear: unless the General Court amends the statute, 
plaintiffs who suffer losses in a form other than money or property 
must pursue their claims under another theory. 
Scope of Chapter 93A: Legislative Developments. Section XV of the 
regulations of the Attorney General provides that "an act or practice 
is a violation of Chapter 93A, Section 2 if: ... [i]t fails to comply with 
existing statutes, rules, regulations or laws, meant for the protection 
of the public's health, safety, or welfare promulgated by the Com-
monwealth or any political subdivision thereof intended to provide 
the consumers of this Commonwealth protection .... "43 The 
rationale of this regulation would appear to be that conduct pro-
scribed by the Legislature or a local governing body has been deter-
mined, through a proper legislative process, to be against the public 
policy of the Commonwealth. Thus, such conduct should fall within 
the broad concept of "unfairness." During the Survey year, this reason-
ing was expressly adopted by the General Court with respect to cer-
tain specified provisions intended to protect the consumer. Chapter 
88 of the Acts of 1975 has amended chapters 255B, 255C, and 255D 
of the General Laws to provide that a violation of those chapters is 
also a violation of chapter 93A. Those chapters regulate the install-
36 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 337 N.E.2d 701. 
37 /d. at 3202-03, 337 N.E.2d at 708-09. 
38 !d. at 3203, 337 N.E.2d at 708. 
39 Violation of G.L. c. 93, § 49 (relating to unfair or unreasonable collection proce-
dures) is expressly made a violation of G.L. c. 93A. G.L. c. 93, § 49. 
40 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3189, 337 N.E.2d at 703. 
41 /d. at 3194-95, 337 N.E.2d at 705. 
42 !d. at 3206, 337 N.E.2d at 709. 
43 REGULATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL§ XV. 
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ment sales of automobiles, insurance, and other goods or services. 
The remedy in equity. It is safe to conclude that the Supreme Judicial 
Court has given the superior court a virtual carte blanche in fashioning 
appropriate remedies for litigants bringing an action under chapter 
93A. The Court in Slaney held that it was irrelevant t~ a private 93A 
action-an action in equity44-that the plaintiff had a~ adequate rem-
edy at law. 45 In DeCotis, the Court sustained the low~r court's broad 
order, which: (1) required the restitution of commissibns determined 
to have been unlawfully collected; (2) required the defendant to seek 
out those persons who had paid such unlawful commissions; (3) re-
quired the payment into escrow of such fees collected from persons 
who could not be located, with unclaimed funds to escheat to the 
state; and (4) e~oined the collection of future commissions.46 Further, 
the DeCotis Court held that the superior court has power to provide 
remedies even beyond those specifically sought by the petitionerY 
Class actions. Neither DeCotis nor Slaney involved a ttue class action, 
although the DeCotis case did involve what has come to:be called "mass 
restitution" at the behest of the Attorney General on b~half of all per-
sons victimized by the unfair act or practice.48 In DeCotis, the Court re-
jected the defendant's contention that only those patties specifically 
named in the Attorney General's complaint could recover,49 and up-
held the lower court's order of restitution to all persons who were 
wronged and who could be identified.50 In Slaney, however, the Court 
did volunteer the following in a footnote: 
It is interesting to note that neither §§9(2) and 11 (3d par.) nor Rule 
23 of the Mass. R. Civ. P .... contains all the procedural strictures 
which have limited the practicality of class actions ip the Federal 
Courts. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) .... Rule 
23(d) of the Mass. R. Civ. P .... seems to permit thf flexibility in 
notification of class members which, before the Eisert case was de-
cided, many commentators had urged be allowed under the Federal 
rule. 51 
This language would seem to instruct the superior courts to be lib-
eral ("flexible") in their requirements for notification to members of 
a class in a class action brought under chapter 93A. Thus, either sim-
ple notification by publication, notification as part of a defendant's 
44 G.L. c. 93, § 9(1). 
45 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 193, 322 N.E.2d at 777. 
46 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1426 nn.2, 3, 1434-36, 316 N.E.2d at 750-51 nn.2, 3, 
755-56. 
47 Id. at 1437, 316 N.E.2d at 757. 
48 See text at note 46 supra. 
49 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1435, 316 N.E.2d at 756. 
50 /d. at 1436, 316 N.E.2d at 756. See text at note 46 supra. 
51 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 192 n.16, 322 N.E.2d at 777 n.16. 
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regular mailing to its customers, or where the class is limited in 
number, more formal notice at the defendant's expense, could be 
found to constitute sufficient notification to the members of a class in 
a chapter 93A proceeding. As the Court stated in Slaney, chapter 93A 
was designed to give consumers an efficient and expedient remedy in 
matters of relatively small moment. 52 That goal would be frustrated 
by unduly complicated and expensive requirements of notification to 
members of a class similarly affected by an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice. 
Subsequent to the close of the Survey year, the Court further dis-
cussed class actions in Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust, 53 holding that 
a motion to certify that the action could proceed as a class action, al-
though not provided for by Rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Civil Procedure, was within the discretion of the trial judge to 
approve.54 Although a hearing is required by section 9(2) of chapter 
93A to determine if the class is adequately represented, the Court 
held that the plaintiff need only show that the members of the class 
are numerous, that there are common questions of law or fact, and 
that the plaintiff is typical of the members represented, i.e., that they 
are similarly situated.55 The Court held, however, that chapter 93A 
overrides Rule 23, which requires the plaintiff to show that the com-
mon question "predominate[s]"56 and that the class action is 
"superior"57 to other methods of redress. 58 Finally, the Court held 
that any number of plaintiffs may join in the suit as named parties, 
taking advantage of a single demand letter sent by one plaintiff de-
manding settlement for the class. 59 
Conclusion. Both Slaney and DeCotis should give inspiration and guid-
ance to those attorneys who have hitherto been reluctant to use the 
remedies of chapter 93A because of its apparent complexity and un-
tried provisions. The Supreme Judicial Court has shown every indica-
tion that the courts of the Commonwealth should aid in achieving the 
intended goals of the Consumer Protection Act. 
§9.2. Consumer Protection: Limitation on Actions. During the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Lynch v. Signal Finance 
Co., 1 was called upon to determine the statute of limitations applicable 
to an action by a creditor against a debtor under section 10(b) of 
chapter 140C of the General Laws, the Truth-in-Lending Act. The 
52Jd. at 191,322 N.E.2d at 776. 
53 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3188, 337 N.E.2d at 701. 
54 !d. at 3195, 337 N.E.2d at 705. 
55 !d. at 3195-96, 337 N.E.2d at 705-06. 
56 MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
57 !d. 
58 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3195-96, 337 N.E.2d at 706. 
59 !d. at 3198-99, 337 N.E.2d at 707. 
§ 9.2. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1182, 327 N.E.2d 732. 
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I 
Court held that the amount recoverable under sectiop 10(b)-twice 
the amount of the finance charge, but not less than ~100 nor more 
than $10002 -constituted a "penalty" within the purviewi of section 5 of 
chapter 260 of the General Laws, and thus required the action to be 
brought within one year of the violation.3 Section 5 qf chapter 260 
provides: "Actions for penalties ... if brought by a p~rson to whom 
the penalty ... is given in whole or in part, shall be cop1menced only 
within one year next after the offense is committed." 
A violation of chapter 140C can occur in one of two situations: ( 1) a 
total failure to disclose as required by the Act, or (2) a ,disclosure that 
does not comply with the Act's requirements. The poirit at which the 
limitation period begins to run is relatively simple to determine in the 
latter case, since the date on which the noncomplying disclosures were 
made can, in most cases, be readily discovered. Where no disclosure is 
made, however, the running of the statute of limitations would appear 
to commence upon the consummation of the transacti@n, since initial 
disclosures may be made at any time prior to the time the transaction 
is ''made"4 or "consummated."5 
The Court in Lynch rejected plaintiffs contention (hat the action 
was one in contract and hence within the longer statute of limitation 
period for contract actions. 6 The Court's holding puts a severe restric-
tion on actions brought under the Truth-in-Lending Act, especially 
where the transaction involved is a long-term credit arrangement. 
Since a consumer would not know of the violation until informed of it 
by counsel after a dispute arose, the statute is likely to have run by 
the time the consumer realized that he was entitled to! recovery. The 
Court's decision is inconsistent with the requirements of both the 
regulations7 under the federal Truth-in-Lending Act8 and the state 
law9 that records of disclosures be retained for two years after they 
were required to be made. 
By contrast, the Court in Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust 10 held 
that an action under the chapter 93A that was essentiallrr an action for 
personal injuries was subject to the two-year statute of: limitations ap-
plicable to actions in tort and actions in contract for personal 
injuries.U Although section 9(3) of chapter 93A allows a minimum re-
2 G.L. c. 140C, § lO(b). 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1187,327 N.E.2d at 734. 
4 G.L. c. 140C, § 6(a). 
5 /d. § 7(a). 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1186-87, 327 N.E.2d at 734. See G.L. c. 260, § 2. 
7 12 C.F.R. 226.6(i) (1976). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). 
9 G.L. c. 140C, § 5(h). 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 337 N.E.2d 701. 
11 !d. at 3201, 337 N.E.2d at 708. See G.L. c. 260, § 2A. The Court :in Baldassari made 
clear that "the sending of a demand letter [is] not the commencemen~ of an action so as 
to satisfy the requirement of the statute of limitations." 1975 Mass.! Adv. Sh. at 3202, 
337 N.E.2d at 708. · 
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covery of twenty-five dollars, which could be construed as a penalty 
similar to that in the Truth-in-Lending Act, the Court did not even 
cite Lynch. 
The matter would appear to have been mooted, however, by chap-
ter 432 of the Acts of 1975, which inserts section SA in chapter 260, 
effective July 15, 1975. Section SA applies a four-year statute of limi-
tations to all actions brought under statutes "intended for the protec-
tion of consumers," including the Truth-in-Lending Act and chapter 
93A. The limitation period begins to run "after the cause of action ac-
crues." This four-year limitation period, however, will apply only to 
causes of action that were not barred prior to the enactment of chap-
ter 432: the Supreme Judicial Court held that the act "does not serve 
to revive actions barred before its effective date."12 
Another change in statutes of limitations for consumer actions was 
effected by chapter 592 of the Acts of 1974, which puts a four-year 
statute of limitations on the right to rescind certain real estate 
transactions. 13 The federal Truth-in-Lending Actl 4 was amended in 
197415 to provide for a three-year statute of limitations on such rescis-
sions. Thus, there is a longer period of time in the Commonwealth to 
exercise such rights. Under both provisions, the statute begins to run 
from the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of 
the property, whichever occurs earlier. 16 
§9.3. Money and Property Exempt from Creditors. During the 
Survey year, persons with low and moderate incomes received substan-
tial assistance from the Legislature by its amendments to chapters 223, 
224, 235, and 246 of the General Laws. The kinds of property and 
amounts of money exempt from attachment and execution were ex-
panded and increased by chapter 501 of the Acts of 197 5. The follow-
ing is a summary of the exemptions under section 34 of chapter 235 
of the General Laws, as amended: 
Property for Personal Use 
Wearing apparel for family 
Uniforms for military personnel 
Heating unit for dwelling 
Household furniture 
Sewing machine 
Bible and books 
Provisions (food, etc.) 
Burial rights and tombs 
Share in agricultural cooperative 
Monetary Limitation 
None 
None 
None 
$3,000 
$200 
$200 
$300 
None 
$100 
12 Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 3201, 337 N.E.2d 701, 
708. 
13 Acts of 1975, c. 592, §SA. See G.L. c. 140C, § 8. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). 
15 Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 405 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f) (Supp. 1976)). 
16 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f) (Supp. 1976); G.L. c. l40C, § 8. 
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Automobile for family use 
Homestead 
Church pew 
Property for Business Use 
Tools of trade 
Stock and inventory 
Equipment of fishermen 
Two cows, twelve sheep, 
two swine, and four tons of hay 
Money or Rights to Money 
Balance for family provisions 
Rent 
Utilities 
Savings or wages due 
Money due or received from 
Public assistance 
$700 
$24,000 
None 
Monetary Limitation 
$500 
$500 
$500 
None 
$300 
$200 per month 
$7 5 per month 
$125 
None 
§9.3 
The new provisions are those that provide exemptions for: ( 1) 
monies aggregated to pay for utilities, rent, and food; (2) bank de-
posits or wages due; (3) monies traceable to public assistance income; 
and (4) automobiles. Clearly, the object of the amendJinents is to give 
wage earners a greater degree of security in their ability to maintain 
themselves and their families. · 
In light of rental costs in urban areas in Massachtlsetts, the $200 
per month exemption for rent is modest. Nonetheles~, it should give 
protection to many families in the lower income brackets. The pur-
pose of the new law may have been better served had the exemption 
also applied to purchase money mortgages on the debtor's dwelling. 
It can only be assumed that the $700 exemption for the family au-
tomobile applies to the debtor's equity in the automobile, i.e., the 
value of the vehicle over and above the amount due under any 
purchase money obligation. Otherwise, in view of today's prices for 
motor vehicles, only a debtor owning a derelict motor vehicle would 
qualify for the exemption. 
Chapter 501 of the Atts of 1975 will also affect the use of sup-
plementary process1 in the enforcement of judgments. By that pro-
cess, a court may require a debtor to produce a statement of affairs in 
order to determine what money and property he owns. 2 If "after a 
full hearing at which the creditor shall have the burden of proof the 
court finds that the debtor has property not exempt under section 
thirty-four of chapter two hundred and thirty-five from being taken 
on execution, the court may order him ... to produce it .... "3 If such 
§ 9.3. 1 G.L. c. 224, § 14 et seq. 
2 ld. §§ 15,16. 
3 Acts of 1975, c. 501, § 3, amending G.L. c. 224, § 16. 
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nonexempt property is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, then the 
court may order the debtor to make partial payments to the creditor. 
The 1975 amendments make clear that such payments may be or-
dered only to the extent that the debtor's income exceeds the amount 
exempted by either federal 4 or state5 garnishment provisions, 
whichever is greater. 6 No payments can be ordered to be made out of 
income derived from federal or state assistance payments. 7 
By reading the "exempt property" restriction in conjunction with 
the limitation on partial payments that can be ordered by the court, it 
is probable that a debtor may aggregate, in addition to money, exempt 
as wages, cash for the purpose of acquiring family provisions to the 
extent of $300, and for the purposes of paying rent of $200 and 
utilities of $75 each month. Monies aggregated for these purposes are 
exempt from execution under section 34 of chapter 235 of the Gen-
eral Laws, and hence constitute "property" that cannot be taken from 
the debtor in supplementary process. For a person of moderate or 
low income, these provisions could grant a total exemption of all 
money due, or held as cash on deposit. 
Chapter 50 1 of the Acts of 197 5 also makes clear that no suit can be 
commenced by the attachment of property that is exempt from execu-
tion under section 34 of chapter 235 of the General Laws.8 Further-
more, under section 32 of chapter 246 of the General Laws, the at-
tachment of wages not otherwise exempted by federal or state law is 
permitted only after judgment against the debtor, and only if "au-
thorized in advance by written permission endorsed upon the writ or 
complaint and signed by a justice, associate justice or special justice of 
the court in which the action is commenced."9 The 197 5 amendments 
provide that such amounts may be attached only to the extent that 
they are "upon money or credits not exempt from execution pursuant 
to [G.L. c. 235, § 34)."10 Such "money or credits" must refer to the 
amounts that may be aggregated for necessaries under section 34 of 
chapter 235 of the General Laws. Otherwise, this addition would have 
little meaning. 
§9.4. Credit Card Users' Claims and Defenses: Federal Limita-
tions. Parties who pay for goods or services by check have the right to 
stop payment on those checks if they do not receive what they paid 
for. 1 Increasingly, bank and other third-party credit cards have sup-
planted checks as a means of payment. The issue thus arose whether 
4 15 u.s.c. §§ 1671-77 (1970). 
5 G.L. c. 246, § 28. 
6 Acts of 1975, c. 501, § 3, amending G.L. c. 224, § 16. 
7 /d. 
8 Acts of 1975, c. 501, § 1, amending G.L. c.223, § 42. 
9 G.L. c. 246, § 32. 
10 Acts of 1975, c. 501, § 9, amending G.L. c. 246, § 32. 
§ 9.4. 1 See G.L. c. 106, § 4-403. 
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a card user could refuse payment to the card issuer br otherwise as-
sert against it rights that the user was entitled to assert against the 
merchant. Card issuers argued against such rights, on the grounds 
that the issuers were innocent third parties with no responsibility for 
the actions of merchants who honored their cards. 
The Massachusetts Legislature took the opposite view, and in 1970 
enacted section 12F of Chapter 255 of the General Uaws, which pro-
vides: 
A creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all 
of the defenses of the borrower arising from the consumer sale or 
lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used, if the creditor 
knowingly participated in or was directly connected with the con-
sumer sale or lease transaction . 
. . . [A] creditor shall be deemed to have knowingly participated 
in or to have been directly connected with a consumer sale or 
lease transaction if: ... (e) the creditor was the isstJier of a credit 
card which may be used by the consumer in the sale or lease 
transaction as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer 
and the seller or lessor. 2 
During the Survey year, the United States Congress, in its 197 4 
amendments to the federal Consumer Credit Protectiqn Act, 3 adopted 
a similar approach, but tempered it with severe if not unworkable 
limitations. A card holder may now, under federal law, assert claims 
or defenses against the card issuer only if: (I) the amount of the 
transaction exceeds fifty dollars, (2) the transaction took place in the 
same state as the address of the card holder or within 100 miles of 
that address, and (3) the card holder "has made a good faith attempt 
to obtain satisfactory resolution ... from the person honoring the 
credit card."4 The geographical and fifty dollar limitations do not 
apply, however, where the transaction is with a person who is the 
same as the card issuer, is controlled by the card issuer, or is a fran-
chised dealer of the card issuer, or where the transaction results from 
a mail solicitation participated in or made by the card issuer. 5 
Furthermore, the claim or defense may be asserted only to the ex-
tent that, with respect to· the particular transaction in dispute, there 
was credit outstanding "at the time the card holder first notifie[d] the 
card issuer or the person honoring the credit card qf such claim or 
defense."6 In determining the amount of such credit outstanding, all 
amounts paid are deemed to have been applied first to late charges, 
2 G.L. c. 255, § 12F. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). 
4 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666i(a) (Supp. 1976). 
5 /d. 
6 /d. § 1666 i(b). 
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then to finance charges, and then to debits in the order that they 
were entered into the account-a first-entered-first-paid concept. 7 
The Massachusetts law provides greater protection than the new 
federal law: there are no monetary or geographical limitations and 
there is no requirement of an effort to resolve the dispute with the 
merchant. Indeed, under the federal law, the greater the "good faith" 
effort of a card holder to resolve the dispute with the merchant, the 
greater the chance for the diminution of his claim against the card is-
suer if payments are being made and are applied against the debit for 
the challenged transaction. 
The crucial question presented is: to what extent does the new fed-
eral law preempt section 12F of chapter 255? The federal Act retains 
the benefits of state law except to the extent and only to the extent 
they are inconsistent. 8 The Act also provides, however, that "[t]he 
[Federal Reserve] Board may not determine that any State law is in-
consistent with any provision of this Chapter ... if the Board deter-
mines that such law gives greater protection to the consumer."9 Regu-
lations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board provide: "A State, 
through its Governor, Attorney General, or other appropriate official 
having primary enforcement or interpretive responsibilities for its 
credit billing practices law, may apply to the Board for a determina-
tion that the State law offers greater protection to the consumer ... or 
is otherwise not inconsistent [with the federal law] .... "10 
The Board's test for inconsistency is whether a creditor can comply 
with state law without violating any provision of the federal law.U 
Since the Massachusetts law contains no limitations on the right to as-
sert defenses, it would seem that a creditor can comply with that law 
without violating the federal statute. Thus, card holders using credit 
cards issued in Massachusetts may continue to assert defenses irre-
spective of the amount of the transaction, of where it took place, or of 
the unpaid amount still due for that transaction. 
§9.5. Correction of Erroneous Billings. In 1971, the Legislature 
enacted chapter 93C of the General Laws, which became effective on 
January 5, 1972.1 This law was designed to deal with the problems 
faced by consumers when they attempt to correct billing errors made 
by creditors whose only response is turned out by computers. Upon 
written notice by a customer, stating the fact of the error, the amount 
of the error, and the reasons for the error, chapter 93C requires a 
7 !d. 
8 !d. § 1666 j(a). 
9 !d. 
10 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(2)(iv) (1976). 
1 1 !d. § 226.6(b)(2)(ii). 
§ 9.5. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 860, §I. 
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creditor to acknowledge, within 14 days, the receipt of such notice 
and, within 60 days after receipt of such notice, to either correct the 
error or explain why the creditor believed there was no error. 2 The 
creditor is entitled to an additional 30 days if he requires additonal 
information from the customer, or an additional 60 qlays if informa-
tion is required from a third party to the transaction. 3 During this 
60-, 90-, or 120-day period, the creditor may not attempt to collect 
the amount in dispute. 4 A noncomplying creditor forfeits finance 
charges with respect to the disputed amount, and if: that amount is 
determined to be in error, the creditor is also liable for the greater of 
(I) actual damages, or (2) a penalty of from $100 to $300.5 The cred-
itor is required to inform the customer of the right to have billing 
errors corrected under these provisions at least once each quarter in 
which a billing statement is sent to the customer. 6 
During the Survey year, the United States Congress, again following 
Massachusetts's lead as it did in the case of truth in lending, added 
chapter 4 (sections 1666-1666j), Credit Billing, to Title I of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act,7 effective October 28, 1975.8 Section 
1666 tracks the general concepts embodied in chapter 93C of the 
General Laws. Section 1666j preserves application of state law "except 
to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this 
chapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency."9 
The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to determine the extent of 
the inconsistency of state laws; 10 without reference to specific state 
laws, -it has done so through amendments to Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. 
226). By recent amendment to regulation section 226.6(b), the Board 
has preempted chapter 93C as it applies to any initial procedures that 
the customer and creditor must take with reference t<fl correcting bil-
ling errors. 11 The Board has ruled that any "differences" between 
state and federal law constitute inconsistency and that the federal law 
has preempted the state law. 12 
The differences between the federal and state enactments are not 
great, but they nonetheless exist. Under the federal law, a customer 
must send written notice of an alleged error within 60 days after a bill 
is sent; 13 Massachusetts law has no such time limitation. 14 The 
2 G.L. c. 93C, § 2. 
3 G.L. c. 93C, § 3. 
4 /d. 
5 /d. § 4. 
6 /d. § 5. 
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970). 
8 Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 306 (Oct. 28, 1974) (codified at 15 U .S.C.A.
1 
§§ 1666-66j (Supp. 
1976)). I 
9 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666j(a) (Supp. 1976). 
10 /d. 
11 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(2)(i) (1976). 
12Jd. 
13 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (Supp. 1976). 
14 G.L. c. 93C, § 2. 
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creditor's acknowledgement of receipt of such notice must be sent 
within 30 days under the federal law, 15 rather than 14 days under 
Massachusetts law. 16 The maximum time for resolution under federal 
law is 90 days, 17 rather than the 120 days provided by Massachusetts 
law. 18 The "forfeiture" for creditor noncompliance under federal law 
is the amount of the disputed item plus the finance charge thereon, 
not to exceed $50. 19 Chapter 93C provides that the noncomplying 
creditor will forfeit all finance charges with respect to the challenged 
item, and, if there was an error, the greater of either actual damages 
or a penalty of from $100 to $300.20 The statement of a customer's 
rights under the federal law must be sent semiannually21 rather than 
quarterly as provided in chapter 93C22 and a creditor may, by proper 
written disclaimer, disallow notice of error which is received on a 
payment receipt or stub sent by the customer, 23 whereas Mas-
sachusetts law has no such permissible limitation. Chapter 93C has no 
definition of "billing error," whereas the federal law and the regula-
tions of the Federal Reserve Board define that term in some detail. 
"Billing error" as defined in the federal Act24 and refined in the 
regulations25 includes the obvious kinds of errors that can appear 
upon a periodic statement: credit not extended or extended to an un-
authorized person, inadequate identification, incorrect failure to cred-
it payments or returns, computational errors, and improper mailing 
address. 26 In addition, the statutory concept of billing error includes 
"[a] reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the 
obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee 
in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a 
transaction."27 The regulations expand upon this, stating that this def-
inition includes not only nondelivery, but also delivery of property or 
services different from that described in any agreement, delivery of 
the wrong quantity, late delivery, or delivery to the wrong location. 28 
Excluded, however, is "any dispute with respect to the quality of 
property in the physical possession of the customer or services per-
formed for the customer .... "29 Thus, the Board's construction of the 
15 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (Supp. 1976). 
16 G.L. c. 93C, § 2. 
17 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (Supp. 1976). 
18 G.L. c. 93C, § 3. 
19 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(e) (Supp. 1976). 
20 G.L. c. 93C, § 4. 
21 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(d)(l) (1976). 
22 G.L. c. 93C, § 5. 
23 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (Supp. 1976). 
24 /d. § 1666(b). 
25 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(j) (1976). 
26 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b) (Supp. 1976). 
27 /d. 
28 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(j)(3) n.l. (1976). 
29 !d. 
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term "accepted"30 as used in the Act is considerably more restnctlve 
than that used in the Uniform Commerical Code, wh!ich provides, in 
simplified terms, that a buyer has accepted if, after in$pection, he has 
indicated a desire to keep the goods as his own or has iotherwise failed 
to reject the goods for any nonconformity. 31 Such nonconformity 
would, of course, include defects in quality. 
There is no such limitation on the definition of billing error in the 
Massachusetts law, and it can therefore be assumedl to include dis-
putes concerning quality. For example, a customer may be in the 
process of either attempting to get an item repaired or replaced, or 
trying to get a refund, when the billing statement arrives. Under the 
federal Act, the customer has no right to "put the brakes on" collec-
tion of the amount due until the problem is resolved! whereas under 
Massachusetts law, attempts by the creditor to colled would be pro-
scribed. 
The regulations, however, allow "inconsistent" state law to become 
operative at the end of the time period when the federal law is 
operative.32 It requires creditors to inform customers of this and to 
apprise them of the danger that they may lose valuab~e federal rights 
by failing to notify the creditor within sixty days-thei time allowed by 
the federallaw. 33 Thus, a customer who does not act within that time 
would still be able to take advantage of the Massachusetts law after 
sixty days, since there is no time limitation specified in chapter 93C. 
In Massachusetts, it would not appear that the customer would lose 
any rights by waiting until the end of the federal sixty-day period. In 
fact, the customer may obtain more favorable rights by waiting until 
the end of that period. This would appear to be the case in situations 
where the quality of a purchased item is at issue, due to the restricted 
definition of "billing error" in the federal law as refined by regula-
tions of the Board. 34 1 
Because Massachusetts law cannot be invoked until sixty days after 
the allegedly incorrect statement was sent (the time for notice of error 
under the federal Act), it would appear that collection procedures 
could be commenced during that period. The solution to this quan-
dary may be for the customer to invoke the federal Act within sixty 
days, and in turn, the state law at the end of sixty days. How this mat-
ter would ultimately be resolved by a recalcitrant cred~tor is unclear. 
Massachusetts, "through its Governor, Attorney General or other 
appropriate official," may apply for a determination by the Board of 
the extent to which its law is not inconsistent with the federal Act or 
30 See text at note 27 supra. 
31 G.L. c. 106, § 2-606. 
32 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(2l(i) (1976). 
33 Id. § 226.6(b)(2)(iii) .. 
34 See text at notes 24-31 supra. 
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that its protections for consumers are greater than those of the fed-
eral Act. 35 For the above reasons, however, it is doubtful that the 
Board would find sufficient consistency for the Massachusetts law to 
prevail during the initial sixty-day period. The preemption in this re-
spect is absolute. 
§9.6. Door-to-Door Sales: Cancellation of Contracts. Mass-
achusetts was one of the first states to provide a consumer with the 
right !O cancel, within a stated period, a credit sale he entered into 
as a result of a door-to-door solicitation. 1 The cancellation period, ini-
tially twenty-four hours, 2 was expanded to three business days, 3 and 
the right to cancel was extended to noncredit consumer transactions 
that exceeded twenty-five dollars.4 To inform the buyer of his right to 
cancel, a conspicuous, although not entirely comprehensible, clause 
was required to be included in the agreement. 5 
In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission held hearings on, and ul-
timately promulgated, a trade regulation rule effective June 7, 197 4, 
to achieve throughout the United States results similar to those pro-
vided by the Massachusetts enactments. 6 The FTC rule, however, re-
quired the seller to furnish, separate from the agreement or sales re-
ceipt, the notice of the right to cancel the sale. 7 This separate form 
could be used by the purchaser to notify the seller that he wished to 
cancel the transaction. 8 In addition, oral notice of the right to cancel 
was required to be given at the time of the transaction. 9 
In response to complaints by door-to-door sellers10 of inconsistency 
between Massachusetts law and the FTC rule, the Legislature enacted 
chapter 90 of the Acts of 1975. That act brings Massachusetts law into 
line with the FTC rule by requiring a separate notice form identical to 
that required by the FTC rule.U Massachusetts law now also requires 
35 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(2)(iv) ( 1976). 
§ 9.6. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 284, as amended, G.L. c. 255D, § 14A(2). 
2 !d. 
3 Acts of 1969, c. .'l 17, § 39, amending G.L. c. 255D, § 14A(2). 
• Acts of 1970, c. 272, as amended, G.L. c. 93, § 48. 
5 !d. 
6 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(b) (1974). 
7 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(b) (1974). 
8 !d. 
9 Id. § 429.1(e) (1974). 
10 Representatives of the Direct Sellers Association vehemently opposed the "cooling 
off period" concept when it was being heard in committee in 1965 and 1966. By 1975 
they had learned to live with the concept and themselves advocated amendments to the 
Massachusetts statute to bring it into compliance with the FTC rule. Their greater fear 
seemed to be of the provisions contained in the National Consumer Act (proposed by 
the National Consumer Law Center) with respect to "outside approval transactions." 
Under those provisions, consumers would be entitled to three days in which to approve 
a transaction consummated outside the seller's place of business. If the transaction were 
not reaffirmed, it would, I by law, be cancelled. See National Consumer Act §§ 
2.501-2.505. 
11 Acts of 1975, c. 90, §§ 1, 6. 
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oral notice12 and gives the seller, upon proper demand or instruction, 
the same rights to recover any goods delivered to th~ buyer that the 
FTC rule affords him. 13 After twenty days without word from the sell-
er, the buyer may keep any goods received. 14 Moreover, chapter 90 
made the Massachusetts law consistent with the FTC f"ule by prohibit-
ing the transfer of any solicited agreement or obligat~on, prior to the 
fifth business day after it was signed. 15 The Massach~setts statute, as 
amended, however, would appear to have surpassed the protections 
afforded by the FTC rule in that it makes an assignee of the seller 
subject, at any time, to the buyer's cancellation, if the seller had origi-
nally failed to provide the buyer with a signed sales! agreement con-
taining the statutory right-to-cancel notice. 16 
The Massachusetts statute provides greater protection than the FTC 
rule, because the former applies to transactions consummated by 
either party at other than the seller's place of busine$s, 17 whereas the 
FTC rule requires personal solicitation by the sdier; 18 Furthermore, 
the FTC rule exempts transactions that are: (1) consummated after 
the buyer first called on the seller at the latter's place of business; (2) 
covered by the right to rescind certain real estate transactions under 
the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act; 19 (3) those in which the 
goods or services are needed in an emergency and the buyer so cer-
tifies; (4) consummated entirely by mail or telephone; (5) those in 
which home improvements are specifically requested at the buyer's in-
itiation; or (6) sales or rentals of real property, sales of insurance, or 
the sale of securities or commodities that are otherwise regulated. 20 
§9.7. Warranties. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act1 (the "Act"), which became effective 
July 4, 1975,2 does not require a manufacturer or other merchant of 
consumer goods to give an express warranty of any kind concerning 
the quality of his goods. What it does require is that, when a written 
warranty is given to a consumer, it be one of two kinds and that it be 
labeled "full warranty" or "limited warranty."3 The term "consumer" 
is defined to include not only the original buyer of a product "nor-
12 !d. §§ 3, 6. 
13 /d. §§ 2, 8. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. §§ 3, 6. 
16 !d. § 3. 
17 G.L. c. 93, § 48A. 
18 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 n.1 (1974). 
19 15 u.s.c. § 1635 (1970). 
20 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 n.1 (1974). 
§9.7. 1 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301 et seq. (Supp. 1976). 
2 /d. § 2312(a). , 
3 !d. §§ 2303, 2304. The Act also confers upon the Federal T~ade Commission the 
authority to regulate disclosure with respect to service contracts. /d. I§ 2306(a). 
' 
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mally used for personal, family, or household purposes,"4 but his suc-
cessor owners as well. 5 The Act applies only to products manufac-
tured after its effective date. 6 
A warranty labeled "full warranty" must (and, by law, will)1 include 
certain minimum benefits to consumers. As defined by the Act, such 
warranty is, in legal terms, a combination of apples and oranges, mix-
ing obligations as to quality with a consumer's remedies when those 
obligations are not met. The "Federal minimum standards" for a "full 
warranty" require: 
( 1) that the warrantor either repair the product "within a reason-
able time and without chat:_ge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or 
failure to conform with such written warranty,''8 or allow the con-
sumer to elect between a replacement or a refund of the purchase 
price if the defects remain "after a reasonable number of attempts" by 
the warrantor to repair them; 9 
(2) that implied warranties not be limited in duration; 10 and 
(3) that any exclusion or limitation of consequential damages for 
breach of any warranty appear conspicuously on the face of the writ-
ten warranty. 11 
The Federal Trade Commission is given broad regulatory authority 
to refine the statutory requirements of the Act. For example, the 
Commission may establish by regulation the number of attempts that 
constitute a "reasonable" number of attempts to repair; 12 may deter-
mine what reasonable duties other than notification to the warrantor 
may be placed upon the consumer; 13 and may prescribe minimum re-
quirements for informal dispute settlement mechanisms that a war-
rantor may include and require as part of the warranty. 14 The Com-
mission quickly promulgated regulations to go into effect on the effec-
tive date of the Act. 15 
Although the Act is aimed primarily at manufacturers who provide 
written warranties with their products, the term "warrantor" is de-
fined to include "any supplier or other person who gives or offers to 
give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an im-
plied warranty."16 Thus, the Act applies to any person in the distribu-
4 !d. § 2301(1). 
5 !d. § 2301(3). 
6 /d. § 2312(a). 
7 !d. § 2304(e). 
8 Id. § 2304(a)(1). 
9 !d. § 2304(a)(4). 
10 !d. § 2304(a)(2). 
11 !d. § 2304(a)(3). 
12 !d. § 2304(a)(4). See text at note 9 supra. 
13 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b)(1) (Supp. 1976). 
14 Id. § 2310(a)(2). See text at notes 28-29 infra. 
15 40 Fed. Reg. 29892 Ouly 16, 1975). 
16 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(5) (Supp. 1976). 
19
Willier: Chapter 9: Consumer Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
184 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §9.7 
tive chain who sees fit to reduce to writing some affirmation as to the 
product's quality or an obligation to repair, replace, or refund should 
a defect arise. Even the dealer in used cars or appliances who gives a 
"quickie" short-term warranty, such as "50-50 for 30 days" falls within 
the ambit of the Act. In order to avoid noncompliaqce, retail sellers 
must determine when a product they sell has been manufactured. If 
the product has been manufactured after July 4, 1975, then its writ-
ten warranty, if any, must comply with the Act.H 
A "limited warranty" is anything less than a "full warranty" as pre-
scribed by the "Federal minimum standards" described above. 18 A 
warrantor may give both a "full warranty" and a "limited warranty" if 
each is so labeled. 19 
Among the many problems posed by the Act is its relationship to 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2° First, the Code 
recognizes only specific remedies for a buyet as to whom a warranty, 
express or implied, has been breached: he can reject the goods or re-
voke his acceptance, obtain a refund of the purchase price, and re-
cover any damages suffered due to the breach.21 If the buyer has ac-
cepted the goods and must keep them, he may recover damages. 22 
Repair or replacement is not among the remedies provided by the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
The issue is thus presented whether a buyer must accept those rem-
edies when provided in either a "full warranty" or "limited war-
ranty" which complies with the federal Act. Subsection (b)(1) of sec-
tion 2311 of the Act provides that "[n]othing in this title shall invali-
date or restrict any right or remedy of any consumer. under State law 
or any other Fedetal law." Taken at face value, this would seem to 
preserve the· Code's remedies as an option always open to Mas-
sachusetts consumers. 23 On the other hand, subsection (b)(2) goes on 
to provide that nothing in the Act, "other than sections [2308] and 
[2304(a)(2) and (4)] shall ... supersede any provision of State law re-
garding consequential damages for i~ury to the person .... "24 Those 
specified sections allow a warrantor giving only a "limited warranty" 
to limit the duration of implied warranties. Thus, it would appear that 
under federal law, a "limited" warrantor may limit his liability with re-
spect to personal injury, notwithstanding that this limitation would be 
in direct contradiction to section 2-316A, added to the Code in Mas-
sachusetts, which prohibits sellers from modifying or disclaiming im-
plied warranties or remedies for their breach. 25 
17 ld. § 2312(a). 
18 Id. § 2303(a)(2). 
19 Id. § 2305. 
20 E.g., G.L. c. 106. 
21 I d. §§ 2-60 I, 2-608, 2-711. 
22 Id. § 2-714. 
23 See G.L. c. 106, § 2-316A. 
24 15 U.S.C.A. § 23ll(b)(2) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). 
25 G.L. c. 106, § 2-316A. 
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Nonetheless, the Act provides: if "upon application of an appro-
priate State agency the [Federal Trade] Commission determines ... 
that any requirement of such State covering any transaction ... (A) 
affords protection to consumers greater than the requirements of this 
title and (B) does not unduly burden interstate commerce, then such 
State requirement shall be applicable .... "26 Thus, relief for personal 
injury could not be foreclosed by a warrantor if Massachusetts applies 
to the Commission for the nonpreemption of section 2-316A, and the 
Commission responds favorably. 
A consumer aggrieved by a violation of the Act may, subject to cer-
tain limitations, bring an action in either state or federal court. 27 The 
Act allows a warrantor, as part of the written warranty, to establish an 
informal dispute settlement mechansim pursuant to standards pro-
m!:_!lgated by the Federal Trade Commission,28 and a consumer is re-
quired to use such mechanism before invoking the Act's legal 
remedies.29 Following an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dispute 
through these informal procedures, the aggrieved consumer may then 
bring suit "in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the 
District of Columbia ... or ... in an appropriate district court of the 
United States .... "30 The right to sue in the federal district court is 
severely limited, however. First, no such claim may be brought unless 
the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000 (exclusive of interest and 
costs). 31 Second, no individual claims smaller than $25 may be aggre-
gated by joinder or by a class action. 32 In addition to these two re-
quirements, there must be at least one hundred named plaintiffs in 
any action brought as a class action.33 Because of these stringent re-
quirements, the bulk of litigation under this federal provision will be 
brought in the state courts. 
The informal dispute settlement procedures provided by the 
warrantor34 need not necessarily be used by the consumer if he wishes 
to bring suit under the Uniform Commerical Code, instead of under 
the federal Act. The provision in a warranty requiring that the con-
sumer use such procedures may be without effect under section 
2-316A of the Uniform Commerical Code since such a provision 
would have the effect of constituting a restriction upon the 
26 15 U.S.C.A. § 2311(c)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
21 /d. § 2310(d}(l). 
28 /d. § 2310(a). 
29Jd. 
30 ld. § 2310(d)(1). 
3 1 /d. § 2310(d)(3)(B). 
32Jd. § 2310(d)(3)(A). 
33 /d. § 2310(d)(3)(C). 
34 See text at notes 28-29 supra. 
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consumer's Code remedies.35 As noted above,36 the Act will not affect 
this state consumer right. 
It appears that a consumer could choose between his state or fed-
eral law remedies, but that one would not preclude the other. A con-
sumer could use his remedies under the Uniform Co~merical Code, 
and before fully prosecuting them, could revert to rem~dies provided 
by the federal Act. Conversely, making use of the rem~dies provided 
by the federal Act should not preclude a consumer from later electing 
to proceed under state law. 
§9.8. Debt Collections. Section 49 of chapter 93 of the General 
Laws which prohibits a creditor from collecting or attempting to col-
lect a consumer debt "in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable man-
ner," has been amended by chapter 155 of the Acts qf 1975 to pro-
scribe such acts by the attorney of the creditor as well. The ~perative effect 
of this amendment is to subject the creditor's attorney, as well as the 
creditor, to the remedial provisions of chapter 93A. 1 · 
The Commissioner of Banks, under the authority vt±sted in him by 
section 24 of chapter 93, has enumerated fourteen pr~ctices that col-
lection agencies, as defined by that section, may not ¢ngage in.2 Al-
though these regulations may not expressly be applicali>le to creditors, 
their attorneys, and assignees, they clearly provide gu~dance for such 
persons in the kinds of conduct prohibited by section 49. 
35 Such provisions would presumably be valid with respect to express warranties if the 
warrantor was the manufacturer of the product and "maintain[ed] facilities within the 
Commonwealth sufficient to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of the 
warranty obligations." G.L. c. 106, § 2-316A. 
36 See text at note 23 supra. 
§9.8. 1 G.L. c. 93, § 49 provides that "[f]ailure to comply with th~ provisions of this 
section shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the provisions of 
chapter ninety-three A." 
2 REGULATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BANKS, REGULATIONS :RELATIVE TO THE 
CONDUCT OF THE BUSINESS OF COLLECTION AGENCIES,§§ 8-18 (1969). 
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